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Unelected power

by Paul M. W Tucker | 18 October 2019
How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracy Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.
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How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracy Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.
Quantity:
In stock online
Delivery in 5 - 7 working days
Eligible for free delivery
92 Reward Points

Any purchases for more than €10 are eligible for free delivery anywhere in the UK or Ireland!

€30.80
In stock online
Delivery in 5 - 7 working days
Eligible for free delivery
Quantity:
92 Reward Points

Any purchases for more than €10 are eligible for free delivery anywhere in the UK or Ireland!

Product Description

How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracy Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.

Product Details

Unelected power

ISBN9780691196305

Format

PublisherPRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (18 October. 2019)

No. of Pages664

Weight636

Language English (United States)

Dimensions 235 x 156 x 44