The Economics of Corruption and Bureaucratic Inefficiency in Weak States

PAPERBACK
Category: Politics
This monograph surveys recent developments in the political economy literature addressing the incentive problems of political decision making, and helps to understand the causes of corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency in countries that lack a constitutional order. Using a principal-agent theoretical framework, the author shows how corruption and patronage may reduce political instability, thus enabling governments in weak states to provide public goods which would otherwise be missing, even though such an institutional arrangement is usually self-defeating in the long run. The theoretical results are used to offer a stylized interpretation of the political history of the Mexican state.
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This monograph surveys recent developments in the political economy literature addressing the incentive problems of political decision making, and helps to understand the causes of corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency in countries that lack a constitutional order. Using a principal-agent theoretical framework, the author shows how corruption and patronage may reduce political instability, thus enabling governments in weak states to provide public goods which would otherwise be missing, even though such an institutional arrangement is usually self-defeating in the long run. The theoretical results are used to offer a stylized interpretation of the political history of the Mexican state.
Currently out of stock
Delivery 5-7 Days
Eligible for free delivery
126 Reward Points

Any purchases for more than €10 are eligible for free delivery anywhere in the UK or Ireland!

€42.00
Currently out of stock
Delivery 5-7 Days
Eligible for free delivery
126 Reward Points

Any purchases for more than €10 are eligible for free delivery anywhere in the UK or Ireland!

Product Description

This monograph surveys recent developments in the political economy literature addressing the incentive problems of political decision making, and helps to understand the causes of corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency in countries that lack a constitutional order. Using a principal-agent theoretical framework, the author shows how corruption and patronage may reduce political instability, thus enabling governments in weak states to provide public goods which would otherwise be missing, even though such an institutional arrangement is usually self-defeating in the long run. The theoretical results are used to offer a stylized interpretation of the political history of the Mexican state.

Product Details

The Economics of Corruption and Bureaucratic Inefficiency in Weak States

ISBN9783631511367

FormatPAPERBACK

Publisher (06 May. 2003)

No. of Pages134

Weight190

Language English (United States)

Dimensions 148 x 208